

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

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P R 171450Z APR 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 0957

ALL MBFR MISSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0192

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: CONTINGENCY QS AND AS FOR APRIL 17 PRESS  
CONFERENCE

THE FOLLOWING QS AND AS, REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY THE AD  
HOC GROUP, WERE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH ANTICIPATED PRESS  
QUERIES AFTER PRESENTATION OF ALLIED PRESS STATEMENT.  
THEY MAY BE USEFUL AT THIS TIME IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH THE  
MEDIA.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. Q. THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SAY THEY HAVE MADE  
SEVERAL NEW PROPOSALS IN THIS CURRENT ROUND AND THAT  
THE WEST HAS REJECTED THEM OUT OF HAND. IS THIS TRUE?

A. THE EAST HAS INTRODUCED SOME VARIATIONS ON ITS  
ORIGINAL PROPOSALS WHICH AFFECT ONLY CERTAIN AMODALITIES  
OF IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS; THEY DO NOT AFFECT THE  
SUBSTANCE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS. THE EAST HAS SUGGESTED  
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THAT THE FIRST TWO STAGES OF ITS THREE-STAGE PROGRAM BE

DIVIDED INTO TWO SUB-STAGES. THE US AND SOVIET UNION WOULD IMPLEMENT THEIR REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST SUB-STAGE; THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD IMPLEMENT THEIRS IN THE SECOND SUB-STAGE. BUT DIVIDING THESE STAGES INTO SUB-STAGES DOES NOT CHANGE THEIR SUBSTANCE. AS FROM THE BEGINNING IT STILL INVOLVES REDUCTIONS OF AN EQUAL TOTAL NUMBER BY BOTH SIDES IN THE FIRST STAGE, AND EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS BY EACH SIDE IN THE SECOND AND THIRD STAGES. THIS APPROACH WOULD PRESERVE THE EXISTING EASTERN ADVANTAGES IN GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA AND WOULD REQUIRE THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES ON DETAILS OF THEIR REDUCTIONS WITHOUT THE ASSURANCE OF PRIOR SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET AND US REDUCTIONS AND EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. THIS IS WHY WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THESE SUGGESTIONS SUFFICE TO BRING ABOUT PROGRESS.

2. Q. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES CLAIM THAT THE WEST HAS NOT STUCK TO ITS OLD POSITION, AND CONSEQUENTLY SHOWN A DISINCLINATION TO JOIN IN A REDUCTION AGREEMENT DURING THIS PAST ROUND. IS THAT A FACT?

A. AS I HAVE POINTED OUT IN MY PRESENTATION, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE WEST HAS MADE A LARGE NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS. WE HAVE A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS STILL ON THE TABLE. WE MADE A VERY IMPORTANT ONE AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND, NAMELY, BY OFFERING A MUTUAL COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. THESE PROPOSALS ARE STILL VALID. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE YET RECEIVED A FULLY CONSIDERED REPLY TO THEM. WE HOPE THE EAST WILL REVIEW THESE WESTERN PROPOSALS AND WORK TOGETHER WITH US IN TRYING TO BRIDGE THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES.

3. Q. SINCE THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE ALLIES HAVE INSISTED THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD REDUCE FIRST. NOW IT SEEMS THE WARSAW PACT HAS MOVED TOWARDS THAT POSITION. WHY IS THERE NO POSITIVE WESTERN REACTION?

A. IN OUR VIEW THE EAST HAS ONLY TO A VERY LIMITED  
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EXTENT ACCEPTED THIS WESTERN REQUIREMENT. THUS FAR THIS ACCEPTANCE HAS NOT GONE BEYOND A DISTINCTION IN THE PROCEDURE OF IMPLEMENTATION BY DIVIDING ITS FIRST AND SECOND REDUCTION STAGES INTO TWO SUB-STAGES. IT HAS NOT MOVED TOWARDS WHAT THE WEST REGARDS AS ESSENTIAL, NAMELY, AGREEMENT TO SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AND AN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. (DRAW FURTHER ON ANSWER #1).

4. Q. THE EAST CLAIMS THAT THE WEST HAS DEALT WITH EASTERN PROPOSALS HASTILY AND THAT THIS SHOWS A LACK OF DESIRE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT. IS THERE ANYTHING IN THIS?

A. WE HAVE GIVEN EACH OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS CAREFUL STUDY. THE BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT THEY DO NOT REPRESENT A REAL CHANGE FROM ORIGINAL PROPOSALS. THEY DO NOTHING ABOUT THE CRUCIAL GROUND FORCE DISPARITY. THEY DON'T TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THE NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS, REQUIRE FIRST PHASE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS BY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND AN AGREEMENT TO THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING ON TOTAL GROUND FORCES MANPOWER TO BE REACHED IN A SECOND PHASE. THE EASTERN PROPOSALS STILL REQUIRE THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THE REDUCTIONS BEFORE ANY REDUCTIONS TAKE PLACE (SEE ALSO ANSWER TO Q. 14 ON NATIONAL CEILINGS). THE EAST ALSO STILL PROPOSES THAT INITIAL REDUCTIONS BY ANY PARTICIPANT SHOULD BE SMALL, WHILE THE WEST FAVOURS MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS. TO SUMMARIZE, WE HAVE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIONS TO THE BASIC FEATURES OF THE EASTERN APPROACH. THE PROPOSALS THEY HAVE SO FAR MADE REPRESENT ONLY SUPERFICIAL CHANGES AND DO NOT DEMONSTRATE A READINESS TO COPE WITH THE SERIOUS ISSUES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 0958

ALL MBFR MISSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0192

FROM US REP MBFR

5. Q. THE WEST SAYS THAT TO BE SATISFACTORY, AN AGREEMENT HAS TO PROVIDE FOR SUBSTANTIAL TROOP CUTS. WOULDN'T THE LATEST MODIFICATIONS OF THE EAST'S BASIC PROPOSAL RESULT IN SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS?

A. THESE PROPOSALS EVEN AS AMENDED STILL PROVIDE FOR ONLY SMALL INITIAL REDUCTIONS BY EACH OF THOSE PARTICIPATING IN THE TALKS. THEY ARE NOT MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE THEY DO NOT DEAL WITH THE SIZEABLE EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN GROUND FORCES.

6. Q. YOU HAVE CHARACTERIZED RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS AS BEING PROCEDURAL ONLY. WHY?

A. THE EASTERN MOVES AFFECT ONLY THE MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACT DRAFT AGREEMENT, BUT DO NOT CHANGE ITS ESSENTIAL CONTENT. THEY SUGGEST PROCEDURAL APPROACHES, BUT DO NOT MOVE TOWARD THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WESTERN POSITION. (SEE ALSO ANSWER TO QUESTION # 1).

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6A. Q. IN THIS ROUND THE WARSAW PACT HAS TABLED NEW PROPOSALS WHICH REPORTEDLY AMEND ITS BASIC POSITION OF NOVEMBER 1973. YOU HAVE REJECTED THESE PROPOSALS. WHY?

A. (DRAW UPON ANSWER TO Q. #1).

7. THE EAST ACCUSES THE WEST OF SEEKING TO EVADE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS BY ALL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IS THIS A FACT?

A. WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ARE NOT SEEKING TO EVADE REDUCTIONS. ALL OF THEM ARE READY TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS AND ARE READY TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO THIS EFFECT. BUT BEFORE THE NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL AGREE ON THE ACTUAL DETAILS OF THEIR REDUCTIONS, THEY WANT TO SEE SIZEABLE SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND AN EASTERN COMMITMENT TO PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

8. Q. WHY ARE YOU OPPOSED TO A "FREEZE"?

A. WE HAVE ALSO PROPOSED A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT. WHAT DIFFERS IS THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH IT WOULD BE UNDER-

TAKEN.

A) THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IS NOT CONNECTED WITH REDUCTIONS, WHICH ARE THE MAIN BUSINESS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS INTENDED AS AN INDEPENDENT STEP AND WOULD SEEM DESIGNED AS A POTENTIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS. IN ANY CASE, AGREEMENT TO IT WOULD REDUCE THE INCENTIVE FOR THE EAST TO AGREE TO THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS THE WEST WANTS. THE WESTERN NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL ON THE OTHER HAND IS PART OF A WHOLE WHICH INCLUDES SIGNIFICANT SOVIET AND US REDUCTIONS.

B) THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF FREEZING FORCE LEVELS AT THEIR PRESENT UNEQUAL LEVEL, CONTRACTUALIZING EASTERN GROUND FORCE SUPERIORITY. THE WEST IS AIMING OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THE WEST TO AGREE TO A SEPARATE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT IN ADVANCE OF AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS, WOULD MEAN THAT IT WAS FORMALLY ABANDONING ITS RIGHT TO CONFIDENTIAL

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ACT UNILATERALLY TO RECTIFY THE GROUND FORCE INEQUALITY, WITHOUT HAVING RECEIVED ANY EASTERN ASSURANCE THAT THE EAST WAS WILLING TO MOVE TOWARD ELIMINATING THIS INEQUALITY THROUGH AGREED REDUCTIONS.

C) IT MAKES NO SENSE TO HAVE A FORCE FREEZE UNLESS ONE KNOWS AT WHAT LEVEL FORCES ARE BEING FROZEN. THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED THE EAST DATA ON THEIR TOTALS OF GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA AND HAVE PROPOSED AN EXCHANGE OF DATA ON AIR AND GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL. THE EAST HAS THUS FAR REFUSED EITHER TO CONFIRM THE ACCURACY OF WESTERN DATA OR TO PROVIDE THEIR OWN DATA.

D) THE EASTERN PROPOSAL SEEKS TO IMPOSE NATIONAL CEILINGS ON THE FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FORESEES A COLLECTIVE CEILING WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE CONTINUED INTRA-ALLIED CO-OPERATION AND SPECIALIZATION NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE WESTERN DEFENSE AT LOWEST COST. (SEE ALSO ANSWER TO Q. #14).

9. Q. IS THERE ANY PROSPECT AT ALL FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THESE TALKS?

A. WE ARE NOT PESSIMISTIC. WE BELIEVE THAT BOTH SIDES WANT RESULTS AND GIVEN THAT MOTIVATION, AND AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF WESTERN VITAL INTERESTS, A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED.

10. Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF

CSCE (SALT) WILL GIVE THE VIENNA TALKS A NEW IMPETUS?

A. WE SEE NO REASON TO WAIT ON CSCE (SALT) TO MOVE  
AHEAD HERE. THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE REAL TESTING  
AREA OF THE GENUINENESS OF EASTERN DESIRES FOR DETENTE IN  
THE MILITARY SECURITY FIELD.

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 0959

ALL MBFR MISSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0192

FROM US REP MBFR

11. Q. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS LATELY ABOUT THE  
INCREASE OF US TROOPS IN EUROPE. ISN'T THIS INCONSISTENT WITH  
THE SPIRIT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. THE DEVELOPMENTS YOU ARE REFERRING TO WILL NOT IN-  
VOLVE AN INCREASE IN US TROOPS IN THE AREA. THEY ARE IN  
COMPLIANCE WITH CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVES, SPECIFICALLY  
THE NUNN AMENDMENT. UNDER IT, THE US IS TO REDUCE THE  
NUMBER OF SUPPORT TROOPS AND IS PERMITTED TO REPLACE THEM  
WITH COMBAT TROOPS.

12. 1. IS THIS BEEFING UP OF US COMBAT FORCES IN EUROPE  
DESIGNED TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE PACT NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA?

A. NO. I HAVE SEEN CERTAIN PRESS REPORTS TO THIS EFFECT. THEY HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVELY DENIED BY US DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMEN. AN EXCHANGE OF COMBAT FOR SUPPORT TROOPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS INTERFERING IN ANY WAY WITH THE TALKS. WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IN VIENNA IS TO REDUCE UNDER A MUTUAL CONFIDENTIAL

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AGREEMENT THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN THE AREA.

13. Q. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH RECENT DISCUSSION IN THE WEST ABOUT INCLUSION OF NATO TACTICAL NUCLEAR ARMS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. CAN YOU COMMENT ON THIS?

A. THERE HAS BEEN CONJECTURE ABOUT THIS. THE ALLIED POSITION REMAINS THAT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS MUST FOCUS ON EXISTING GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES FAVORING THE WARSAW PACT, WHICH IN OUR VIEW ARE THE SERIOUS DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE CURRENT MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE. FINDING A SOLUTION TO THIS CENTRAL ISSUE IS THE MAIN PROBLEM OF THESE TALKS. IT WOULD REDUCE THE RISK OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND THE ASSOCIATED RISK OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION AND IS, THEREFORE, THE MOST DIRECT WAY TO ENHANCE SECURITY IN THIS AREA.

14. Q. THE ALLIES CONTINUE TO OBJECT TO NATIONAL CEILINGS IN THE REDUCTION PROCESS. WHY? HOW ELSE WOULD THE EAST BE ASSURED THAT FORCES WOULD STAY REDUCED?

A. IT IS TRUE THAT, THUS FAR, THE EAST CONTINUES TO INSIST ON NATIONAL CEILINGS. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT WE CANNOT AGREE TO SUCH LIMITATIONS. THEY WOULD INTERFERE WITH NATO INTEGRATED DEFENSE CO-OPERATION, AND THEY WOULD PREJUDICE THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

15. Q. DO YOU THINK IN VIEW OF ALL THE ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE WEST GLOBALLY THAT THIS IS THE RIGHT TIME TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON FORCE REDUCTIONS?

A. THE WORLD'S LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF MILITARY FORCES IS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT CONTINUES TO BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE THIS CONFRONTATION AND THUS LESSEN THE CHANCES OF AN OUTBREAK OF A CONFLICT IN THE AREA.

16. Q. RECENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS HAVE CREATED MANY PROBLEMS FOR NATO. HAVE THESE AFFECTED THE VIENNA TALKS?

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A. NO. COHESION AMONG THE ALLIES IN VIENNA IN DEPLOYING A CO-ORDINATED ALLIED POSITION CONTINUES AS STRONG AS IN THE PAST.

17. Q. AS A RESULT OF GLOBAL US DIFFICULTIES AND THE MOOD OF A NEW CONGRESS, WILL THIS AFFECT THE US STAND AT THE TALKS?

A. THE US IS WORKING IN CLOSE CO-OPERATION WITH ALL ITS ALLIES IN THESE TALKS. I CAN, OF COURSE, NOT PREDICT AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS. PAST EFFORTS MADE TO BRING ABOUT US UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS FROM EUROPE HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL. THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HAS STATED PUBLICLY THAT IT STRONGLY OPPOSED EFFORTS AIMED AT UNILATERAL US TROOP WITHDRAWALS.

18. Q. THERE IS TALK OF A NATO SUMMIT IN EUROPE SOON. WILL THAT DEAL WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. IF SUCH A MEETING TAKES PLACE, WE CAN ASSUME THAT IT ALSO WILL REVIEW THE STATUS OF THESE TALKS.

19. Q. GIVEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, MIGHT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES BE CONTENT TO SIT OUT DEVELOPMENTS AND NOT MAKE ANY MOVE IN VIENNA?

A. IT IS NOT FOR ME TO SPECULATE ON EASTERN MOTIVES OR INTENTIONS. IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT THE EASTERN SIDE HAS SO FAR SHOWN STRONG INTEREST IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON ITS TERMS. BUT WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT WE MUST REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. END TEXT. RESOR

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